Book II Forces and orders of battle

The force model distinguishes historical identity, fictional mobilisation, theatre assignment and player control. A division visible on a theatre map is not automatically a selectable deck, a full-strength formation or an additional inventory.

Common scale

The usual manoeuvre counter has one battalion-sized combat core. British armoured regiments, American tank battalions and German Panzer-Abteilungen use national names within the same operational class. Comparable scale does not require equal tank or personnel totals. Infantry brigades and regiments resolve into battalions.

The Soviet medium tank regiment is a deliberate larger core, with a proposed 65-tank establishment. Its motor-rifle battalion remains a separate counter; the same infantry and vehicles cannot be counted twice. Company, squadron or battery is normally the smallest independent ground counter. First Orders is the deliberate company-scale introduction.

Army, corps, division and brigade markers show command and aggregation. Zooming in replaces an aggregate with its children, not an aggregate plus a second stock of units. Persistent IDs survive losses, refits, detachments and transfers. Requisition fills an authorised vacancy or activates a recorded reserve; it never clones a unit.

Independent support

Artillery, AA, reconnaissance, engineers, logistics and listed security formations have independent positions, movement, equipment and supply. They can be intercepted and attacked directly if the front is breached. An administrative attachment does not teleport them into a friendly battalion or automatically create an escort.

Support committed to an engagement is unavailable to a simultaneous incompatible engagement. Range, readiness, communications and supply determine eligibility. Exact intervention distances and timing remain proposals to test against the map. Most force density must still come from mainline formations capable of covering sectors and retaining a reserve.

Britain and the northern coalition

The Helmstedt player commands selected 7th Armoured subunits. The theatre view includes the wider BAOR, adjoining infantry divisions, occupation duties and reserves. The reviewed neighbouring arrangement uses 43rd Wessex to the north, 53rd Welsh to the south and 4th Armoured Brigade in reserve; these are scenario assignments, not a certified April deployment return.

Polish support in the north is available and must be concentrated and organised. It has no new political-release gate. The 1st Polish Armoured Division and 1st Independent Parachute Brigade are separate force pools; parachutists are not automatically committed to an airborne operation. Polish II Corps from Italy is a possible later southern contribution, requiring a separate retained-force decision and transit plan, not simultaneous deployment in several theatres.

Belgian brigade groups and a Dutch battalion growing toward a brigade are coalition proposals. Exact child identities and availability remain to be resolved. Danish participation belongs primarily to the northern/Baltic planning question and needs its own dated contingent; an unverified ready Danish division must not be inserted into the opening.

Australian and New Zealand contributions require national agreement, relief of other commitments, shipping and refit. They are late-summer candidates, not guaranteed arrivals or an instant ANZAC division. Canadian retention also requires a distinct national decision. Summer should show a denser, genuinely mobilised theatre, with every new formation sourced.

Americans and French

Third Army supplies the southern American core and its wider occupation context. Use retained or recalled formations and separate regiments supported by dates, rather than importing its entire 1945 order of battle. The proposed 9th Infantry group and the detailed corps allocation still require readiness checks.

French occupation formations can be visible before France releases a field contingent. Offensive participation is conditional on battlefield performance and national decisions. A division dissolved before the opening requires explicit retention or reconstitution; old formation names do not prove readiness. French commitments must also be reflected in the saved campaign state.

Reformed German force

The reformed 1st Panzer Division is accepted alternate-history direction. Its initial presence is a headquarters/training skeleton and reservist security units in the American rear, not its armoured main body. The security Panzergrenadiers use available Sd.Kfz. and M3 halftracks. Surviving security units develop into later Panzergrenadier units without duplicating personnel.

US-refined Panthers and M4 Shermans arrive as training, refurbishment and supply permit. German volunteering responds to confidence in the American campaign; volunteers alone do not create trained crews or serviceable tanks.

The proposed eventual manoeuvre pool is a Panther battalion, Sherman battalion, three Panzergrenadier battalions and an assault-gun battalion, with separate reconnaissance, artillery, engineers, AA, logistics and recovery. Earlier targets of 45 Panthers, 45 Shermans and 31 assault guns remain design proposals, not approved balance or historical returns.

StuG III G is the preferred refurbishment candidate, with limited StuH 42 substitution; Panzer IV H/J and compatible StuG IV batches are possible stopgaps. Jagdpanzer IV variants are specialist candidates. This is not a documented Manteuffel/Speidel procurement programme. Refurbishment specifications, exact cards, maintenance and ammunition policy remain open.

German Security Forces (US Zone) is a working institutional name. The final name and German command appointments are unresolved. The division operates under occupation authority through Patton’s field command and Third Army; it is not the Bundeswehr of a German Federal Republic.

Czechoslovak forces

A common Czechoslovak command contains Czech and Slovak personnel and traditions. Separate Czech and Slovak armies would require an additional political divergence.

The western-government force proposal uses 16th Division around the northwestern approaches and 11th Division around Plzeň and the southern approaches, under the relevant western command. I/15, II/15 and I/19 are researched northern candidates; III/15 remains a cadre, not an automatic combat battalion. The 11th Division’s exact child identities remain unresolved.

March T-34 deliveries support consideration of a limited later tank contribution. A proposed 21-tank battalion from 2nd Tank Brigade requires a readiness, allegiance and allocation decision. June holdings cannot be backdated to April. Western or Soviet equipment lineage does not determine a unit’s political loyalty.

The Free force begins with a composite border detachment and organising cadre. It grows through the same surviving identity into a battalion, then a field group; an eventual 1st Czechoslovak Infantry Division (Free) remains a formation target. An intact defection changes one unit’s allegiance, not the creation of a duplicate. “The Legion” can be informal period-inspired usage, not a claim of legal succession to a particular First World War legion.

Soviet allocation

Germany and Austria have distinct operational obligations. Eighth Guards Army remains the northern threat to the Bavarian sector; it is not moved wholesale to Prague. The Bohemian group is currently an unfunded requirement, with its historical parent deliberately left unassigned after withdrawal of the Austrian-donor proposal.

The research contains disputed transfer/redesignation dates for 3rd and 4th Guards Tank Armies. They cannot be used as free extra reserves until the chronology is reconciled. The May 1945 Prague OOB and the 1968 intervention are not interchangeable sources for April 1946.

Establishments and active force tables

The current v3 Helmstedt source authorises 65 Soviet medium tanks per regiment. The selected British target is 61 gun/CS tanks plus 11 reconnaissance Stuarts: mixed regiments use 43 Cromwells, 12 Fireflies and 6 CS tanks; the Comet regiment substitutes 61 Comets. These are authored establishments, with exact April holdings and mixtures still unverified.

Older v2 saves retain their 48/52-tank authorisations and losses; loading them must not award free tanks. The old 188-record proposal and the 58-slot southern plan are different inventories and must never be summed. The southern 36×35 plan has 58 opening slots and 43 later/cadre entries; several Soviet slots have no sourced formation.

The Bible’s force register owns current reviewed planning rosters, hierarchy, assignment status and map references. Runtime stock remains in the versioned force manifests until implementation changes are verified. Equipment families records research and production status without treating every researched family as fielded.